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BOLIVIA TODAY

An Assessment Nine Years After the Revolution

by Richard W. Patch

La Paz
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The View from La Paz

The shield of the city of La Paz shows a lion lying down with a lamb and bears the legend, "the discords in concord." This is a fitting theme for a capital and a country, both founded amid discord, both--after four centuries--maintaining an uneasy truce among discordant groups.

La Paz is the impossible city, quite incredible as the capital of one of Latin America's larger republics. It is 12,000 feet above the level of the Pacific, yet airplanes at the city's international airport at El Alto must land and lumber off the ground again over a thousand feet higher still. The sun at this altitude soon burns the skin of the unaccustomed, and even the native Paceños carry bright spots of color in their cheeks and smile painfully through cracked lips. The newcomer finds himself gasping for breath walking a few blocks to the post office, and may find himself incapacitated by sorroche, or altitude sickness. But strangely enough it is not so often the stranger who is prostrated by the headache, nausea, and cramps of sorroche but native Paceño who descends to sea level and returns again to La Paz to discover the time-honored rem-

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edies of newspapers on the chest and liberal libations of pisco unavailing.

Yet soccer teams meet every Sunday afternoon in the stadium, sandaled bearers shouting "permiso!" dash through the streets carrying 90-pound loads of freshly killed beef, and most people pay no more attention to the thin air than they do to the nearly constant rain from October to March.

The "summer" is often colder than the dry bright winter because the low clouds and fleecy mists block out the sun. Most of the time the clouds let fall a slow drizzle which Paceños shrug off. But occasionally thunderheads release a downpour of rain and ice crystals the size of peas which turns the steep roadways into torrents, washing whole blocks of houses down the muddy mountainsides. Even the British Embassy residence has been gently slipping down hill for years, resisting all efforts to halt its stately progress.

There is practically no level ground in La Paz aside from the soccer field and the parade ground of the Military School. La Paz is just beyond, and under, the edge of the 13,000-foot Altiplano, at the point where the immense plateau breaks into fissures, canyons, gorges, and weird monuments of alluvial debris rapidly being washed away and cut anew by the summer rains. The capital of Bolivia is precariously set into one of the more spacious of these declivities, in shape more like a cup than a bowl because of the steep inclination of the enclosing mountains. The bottom was crowded with buildings long ago, for generations there has been no place to go but up. And up the houses have gone, many only to come sliding down again the following summer. Through the city flows the viscous, yellow Rio Choqueyapu.

In this setting live a fascinating mixture of people. Aymará-speaking campesinos--many new to the city since the revolution of 1952--cliff-hang to the upper reaches of the city. By day they descend to the center, the women squatting in innumerable sidewalk markets selling, or hoping to sell, a few vegetables, a handful of dried potatoes, or a small pile of quinoa. The men, if they are fortunate, have a job, as porter, domestic servant, or--rarely--factory hand. Crowds of campesinos spill into the streets outside government offices, eternally waiting for the ponderous bureaucratic wheels to produce still another signed stamped paper.

The narrow 16th- and 17th-century streets are lined with tiny shops, many kept by German refugees of two world wars. One is as likely to hear German on the streets of La Paz as Spanish in New York. The shops sell a bewildering variety of goods, only a few specialize in hardware, or clothing, or food. Most sell radios, toys, kitchen utensils, cameras, whisky, yard goods, candy, and bulk glue; all in a space rather larger than a closet. Among the shopkeepers there is a liberal sprinkling of Yugoslavs, Arabs of many nationalities, Japanese, and Russians. Nearly all are refugees of one or another war. Spaniards who fled the Civil War sought other occupations.

The once large British colony has largely disappeared since the Government took over the railroad which was its livelihood. The Anglo-American Club is a sorry shadow, where a full staff still spends long evenings waiting for an occasional English-speaking Bolivian to sip a whisky and play a nostalgic game of dice with the manager. The American population, nearly all working for the Embassy or ICA, is moderately large but transient. The Bolivian ICA program has the highest turnover rate in the world--few remain longer than two years, and few participate in any life outside their own.

The majority of Paceños are mestizos, of mixed Spanish and indigenous origin. Many speak both Spanish and Aymará, but the city-born speak an imperfect Aymará learned in childhood from servants. Most are miserably poor, earning between $20 and $50 a month, even in the higher ranks of the government service. As a result the Paceños are even more active than the rest of their countrymen in supplementing their income by smuggling. The Government tolerates traffic in contraband to the extent that the contrabandistas have organized a large market near the railroad station which offers only smuggled goods: clothing, canned goods, liquor, cigarettes, tools, and Peruvian matches (made in Sweden). The contrabandists have even formed their own union, and do a thriving business on the days trains arrive from Arica or Antofagasta, Chile. The mestizos normally wear Western dress, although some of the more conservative mestizas still retain the pollera (full skirt), derby hat, and braids of the campesina. Most own radios, participate in an elaborate system of compadrazco (ceremonial kinship), and make considerable sacrifices to give fiestas and to educate their children.

La Paz has not decided to what century it belongs. Striking 16th-century buildings such as the Church of San Francisco continue in daily use. Most streets are cobbled, some with a gutter down the center to carry away slops and refuse thrown and swept into them. Pack trains of llamas browse and arch their necks in the suburb of Calacoto. Men wash their ponchos, women their polleras on flat rocks beside the river. St. John's Day, on the winter equinox, is celebrated by lighting bonfires in the streets and on the hillsides as has been done for time out of mind in Catalonia. All Soul's Day is observed in the houses where a death has occurred in the past year by piling a series of altar-like tables with bread, pastries, roasted chickens, jars of chicha, and other delicacies to nourish the famished spirit who returns that night to his earthly abode. The same ritual is observed the following day in the cemetery when food is placed on the grave and brass bands serenade the departing soul.

But the visitor who has come expecting to be transported into the Middle Ages is apt to be surprised. Two hotels are modern and comfortable, a third makes a valiant attempt. The national University of San Andres is housed in a single skyscraper. The new blue-tinted YPFB building, headquarters of the state petroleum corporation, is a modest version of the colored panel wonders in Manhattan. Throughout all, however, there is a blending of old and new, indigenous and imported.

The spacious Prado, a thoroughfare and park at the bottom of the "cup," is thronged on Sunday mornings by Paceños coming from Mass and strolling around and around the gardens, a promenade which now occurs in only a few parts of Latin America. Traffic lights have been installed, but they are manually operated. If the traffic policeman is imprudent enough to hold vehicles with a red light, the motorists impatiently honk at him. City water is usually turned off at night, giving the sewer lines a chance to drain into the mains. Electric current is insufficient for the entire city, and is cut off for a part of the day in each section. Television has yet to bring its blessings to Bolivia, but the lack is amply filled by radio serials which are mournful versions of "Ma Perkins" and Lorenzo Jones" of the early '30's. Campesinos crowd the modern clinics, but they also visit native curers and wear coca leaves on their cheeks to relieve eye diseases. Campesino men smoke tobacco when it is available, but still chew coca mixed with lime. All classes drink commercial beer on occasion, but campesinos and mestizos alike consider it a luxury to drink chicha (a maize beer brought from Cochabamba).

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Convivial Sunday afternoons spent drinking chicha while playing sapo, a game consisting of throwing disks at the mouth of a metal frog, are becoming rare in La Paz and in Bolivia. Chicha is expensive and money is scarce. A constant damper on more boisterous spirits is the tension which has grown steadily in the capital since Víctor Paz Estenssoro began his second term in office in August 1960.[1] Questions have become more imperative: What will he do about the rising cost of living, frozen wages, constantly declining real income? What will he do about problems from a stagnating agrarian reform to plummeting tin production? As the months have passed the fear grows that he will do nothing, and that Bolivia can drift into experiences worse than the 1952 revolution. On February 21, 1961, tension became more palpable as the Government ordained a state of siege (suspension of civil rights) in all the republic. Right of assembly was banned, and a curfew was imposed, enforced by an irregular and unpredictable militia.

Bolivia has once more arrived at a stage in its national revolution when something must be done, and it must be done rapidly and effectively. The situation is reminiscent of 1956 when hyperinflation destroyed confidence in the national currency. Drastic steps were taken, but they appear only to have delayed the reckoning. Now the Government must move firmly, in many directions, or the lion couchant will become the lion rampant.

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[1] His first: 1952-1956. See appendix, "Bolivian Personalities: Political Data in Brief."

Ideals and Norms

A political tradition is not formed by invention or aspiration, it grows as a part of a whole culture, its shape and direction determined not so much by the will of men as by the way past generations have created a body of ideas by which men understand and interpret themselves and their universe. This body of ideas does not exist as a collection of independent parts: religious, political, economic, social; it is a living, changing, interrelated mass with intimate connections between such apparently diverse aspects as responsibility for godchildren and the political orientation of the state. Throughout a culture there exist both ideals and norms which are accepted as natural or inevitable. The ideals are verbalized, the norms are visible only by observation and association. It is one of the most difficult tasks of the student, in his own or in other societies, to separate the ideals drilled into his consciousness, from the norms which often lie below the level of consciousness. But as he becomes more proficient in the exercise he becomes more aware of the discrepancy between the two, and that the ideal may exist in a culture for generations or centuries with little influence on the norm. It takes more than a dedicated man or group of men to shape the norm toward the ideal, it takes a somewhat mysterious readjustment of communal ideas affecting not only the norm in question but many others. In the United States family solidarity is an ideal but the norm is far different. To achieve the ideal would require a vast reorganization of the mobility-emphasizing economy, a renewal of authoritarian religion, and a re-definition of the concept of individual liberty.

These generalities are necessary as a context for appreciating the naturalness, the nonuniqueness of the discrepancy between ideal and normal political behavior in Latin America and Bolivia in particular. Bolivia did not form its political norms out of air at the beginning of its wars of independence from Spain in 1809 nor at their conclusion in 1825. The wars were not so much against a political system as against a class which monopolized positions in that system. It is no paradox that the norms regulating nearly three centuries of colonial administration were incorporated into the new republic, nor is it strange that the ideal political forms were imported from the new experiments in France and the United States. It would be a mistake to expect that the new ideals, carefully written into several constitutions, would affect the norms until many other ideas were changed or abandoned. Thus the norms of centralism, dependence on a strong head of state, legislation by executive decree, subjection of legislature and judiciary, and an active political role of the army were normal, and the ideal forms modeled on other countries and other cultures had to exist as best they could in a hostile climate. La Paz might well proclaim its preoccupation with bringing concord from this discord.

Since the collapse of the governments of Perón in Argentina, Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Batista in Cuba, a military junta in Bolivia, and the passing of Odría in Peru; and their replacement, except in Cuba, by relatively democratic forms; most

commentators have concluded that the old norms have been abandoned. They are too quickly impressed that the new democratic ideals have taken deep root and that strongman rule has passed from the scene of political normality. They forget the weaknesses that are inherent in majority rule, weaknesses that are occasionally apparent in the United States from New Orleans to New York. These are even more apparent in Latin America where the potential strength and richness of majority rule, when minority interests are protected, are appreciated in the abstract, but have been only briefly experienced historically. In particular, democratic forms labor under immense difficulties when they are grafted onto a government controlled by an economic minority uninterested in the economic welfare of the majority, or onto a government of a country in which economic development is temporarily blocked.

This preamble is introductory to a statement of my conviction that Latin America is in an era not of the ultimate triumph of democratic forms, but the trial of these forms and the final outcome is by no means certain. Cuba is but one example of what can happen. Bolivia illustrates with painful clarity the obstacles in the way of converting democratic ideals into political norms when the course of economic development has been interrupted by a social revolution. The type of revolution which occurred in Bolivia in 1952 can easily happen in other Latin American countries, thus the Bolivian case is of more than isolated interest. And it is also abundantly clear in Bolivia that the old political norms which are the antithesis of democracy still lie below the surface of the new ideals and provide an ever-ready alternative of totalitarianism. If the democratic ideals fail, as they have twice in Spain, it will be many years before they are tried again.

Three Phases of Revolution in a Democratic Setting

Bolivia and Mexico illustrate, in Latin America, that there are three principal stages in a revolution which breaks sharply with a past of majority oppression by a minority. The first is destruction of the institutions which supported the power of the minority: land tenure patterns, the structure of the government, Church privilege in Mexico, class differences in Bolivia. The second stage is the construction of new idealized and sometimes romantic institutions --often invented from whole cloth--usually at considerable variance with old norms, customs, and modes of thought; not all of which can be destroyed or reformed even by as thorough an attempt as was made by the French Directorate. This introduces a period of disorganization bordering on chaos. At one and the same time the political system, the economy, and customary social behavior are malfunctioning, confused, and often working in opposite directions. Only constant reiteration of the ideals of the revolution hold together a population discouraged with the realities they have wrought. Public demonstrations, impassioned speeches, emphasis on new personal liberties serve the purpose for a time. During this time the political leaders tinker with the new institutions, especially those affecting the economy, trying to bring them into co-ordination

with ideas and behavior which have not changed--to develop new norms which, whatever their relation to the ideals, have the supreme advantage of working.

If the leaders are fortunate, they bring about the third stage in which an invigorated economy brings a rising standard of living to the majority which controls the political destiny of the experiment. Mexico has at least partially succeeded in entering the third stage, bringing material advantages to part of the urban population--after 50 years. Bolivia has destroyed more institutions in a much shorter period than Mexico, and it appears the time for tinkering will also be correspondingly shorter. In fact there is much evidence that the time allowed the Bolivian Government for "words not deeds" is very nearly at an end. The Bolivian revolution has been particularly chaotic, with declining production; hyperinflation; virtual destruction of the upper class, the army, the national police; and a mass exodus of professionals. For nine years the impoverished urban wage earners, the campesinos, and the desperately poor miners have listened to leaders of the revolution exhorting them to work harder while problems are being solved. After nine years the problems have not been solved; the standard of living has fallen rather than risen; and workers, teachers, doctors, and even smugglers have formed unions which--because the Government has absorbed so much of private enterprise--find themselves striking against the Government. Now, as Bolivia's MNR Government prepares to enter its second decade, it has lost most of the resilience which formerly softened these blows. To cope with its multiplying problems it must obviously take a much stronger line which will adversely affect a large sector of the population. The overriding question is, has the MNR Government exhausted its good will? Has it waited too long? Will the Government be able to construct the economic foundation which must support the real advances in liberty and dignity achieved by the campesinos? Or will Bolivia turn once again to a strongman or a corporate dictatorship and a sacrifice of liberties to bring order to a completely disorganized economy?

The Invented Ideal Institutions

Among the ideals created to substitute for institutions destroyed in 1952 are the COMIBOL, the government agency administering the nationalized mines; the agrarian reform, intended to put some order into the campesinos' division of land; an economic stabilization plan, hopefully meant to halt inflation and stabilize foreign exchange; and the "monolithic" MNR (Nationalistic Revolutionary Movement) party, which in truth is more a coalition of many political outlooks than a unified party.

The COMIBOL (Bolivian Mineral Corporation) was to bring national planning to the large mines which had been nationalized, improving the working conditions of the miners and diverting profits from the private owners to the government. But, encountering realities, COMIBOL did not have capital to explore for new reserves to replace the depleted mines, nor to replace machin-

ery and tools which were obsolete and in poor repair. The miners became one of the most powerful political groups in the country. Large numbers were hired by COMIBOL for political reasons, to the point where only some 30 per cent worked in productive jobs below the surface. Consequently COMIBOL lost money, and the nationalized mines became a liability rather than an asset.

The agrarian reform was meant to divide land, particularly the feudalistic latifundios, among the landless campesinos; protect the "medium size" holdings which were efficiently farmed; and provide technical assistance to farmers to raise production. Instead the campesinos divided the land among themselves before the formal agrarian reform apparatus was organized, and available land was occupied whether or not farming procedures had been efficient or whether former owners were theoretically protected under the law. The Agrarian Reform Council has slowly gone about the business of examining legal appeals, resolving disputes, and sending titles to the President of the Republic for his signature. President Siles (1956-1960) allowed the petitions and titles to accumulate, and at the end of his term a great number were returned to the Agrarian Reform Council without being processed. In the Council building the papers were piled in orderless heaps. Today a campesino wishing to determine the situation of his petition for title must pay a functionary to go through the confusion of papers--with little hope of success. It is a common saying that at the present rate it will take 30 years to complete the agrarian reform. However this is only the legal side of the matter. The actual division of the land is an accomplished fact, but the campesinos are still eager to secure the title which would confirm their possession. Without the title they are afraid to leave the land they have occupied in the hands of parents or other relatives for fear it will be taken from them. Yet resettlement out of the greatly overcrowded areas where redistribution has taken place most intensively is one of the urgent needs of the country. The Agrarian Reform Council has never made operational its plans for technical help to small farmers. Production has not increased in the areas of redistribution, the campesinos are consuming more of their own products, there is a smaller surplus for the cities. Since 1952 Bolivia has been forced to import large quantities of food at the same time the tin mines produce less foreign exchange to pay for it.

The stabilization plan was imposed in 1957 by the International Monetary Fund and the United States. It succeeded in stopping the devaluation of the national currency on the free market. It abolished the official exchange rate, froze wages, restricted credit, and slowed the inflation. But it was stabilization at an intolerably low level. Wages were allowed only to approximately double before the plan went into effect, while decontrolled prices increased some ten times. Since 1957 prices have continued slowly upward while money wages have remained approximately the same. Thus real wages have constantly declined. Urban workers and miners have suffered real deprivation, especially the miners whose subsidized commissary goods were eliminated. The economic development which stabilization was to encourage has not materialized because public funds have been diverted elsewhere and private funds

are reluctant to enter Bolivia given the unpredictable political situation.

The Nationalistic Revolutionary Movement is itself a kind of idealized institution. When it was formed in the early '40's it attracted the support of nationalistic intellectuals and junior army officers, veterans of the Chaco War (1932-1936). Bolivia's defeat in the war with Paraguay created problems which traditional governments and parties could not overcome. The MNR became stronger, and by the time of its successful revolution in 1952 it had absorbed elements of the far left, the moderate right, and the center. It included former or present Communists of the PIR, the POR, and other splinter parties; self-declared Trotskyites; Marxists; utopian Socialists; men with no other politics than ardent nationalism; men of property with political ambitions; and army officers with Fascist inclinations inspired by Italy and Germany. In the rapid events of the revolution and the excitement of destroying the old and creating the new the miscellaneous sectors cohered in a semblance of a party. But from the beginning the MNR was split into left, right, and moderates, and as time passed the cleavages grew. The left was headed by Juan Lechín, who built his strength in the mine unions and was the first MNR Minister of Mines and Petroleum, and by Ñuflo Chavez Ortiz, the first Minister of Campesino Affairs. Hernán Siles Zuazo, son of former President Hernando Siles, was spokesman of the moderates and Vice President in the MNR's first administration (1952-1956). An ambitious man on the right was Wálter Guevara Arze, first MNR Minister of Foreign Affairs. MNR founder and first President, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, has generally been considered moderate by inclination, but events have forced or lured him at different times from one end of the political camp to the other.

The first open rupture in the party occurred during Paz's first administration. Relations with the left were strained when Paz removed Lechín from the Ministry of Mines. He had overstepped himself after becoming unpopular by attempting to take away the universities' prized autonomy and putting them under the control of the Government. A reconciliation with the left was attempted in the elections of 1956 when moderate Siles Zuazo ran as presidential candidate and leftist Chavez Ortiz became the vice presidential candidate. A more serious break took place not long after the elections when Chavez Ortiz attempted to force Siles to resign, miscalculated, and was himself forced into political limbo for the rest of Siles' term. Siles dedicated himself to moderate policies, particularly the unpopular stabilization plan. In the process he lost much of his own popularity and both left and right took on new hope for the elections of 1960. (After the elections Siles, at his own request, was appointed Ambassador to Uruguay. Congress refused to confirm the appointment, but the President asked him to remain anyway.) Frederico Alvarez Plata, President of the Senate and Acting Vice President, and Wálter Guevara Arze both hoped to be named the MNR presidential candidate. However, Víctor Paz Estenssoro announced at a late date that he would be a candidate for the nomination, which effectively ended anyone else's chances. Paz further incensed Guevara Arze and the right by naming Juan Lechín as his running mate. Guevara

was sufficiently bitter over this frustration of his ambition to become the first major leader to break with the MNR. Before the election he formed his own party. Because the symbols of the MNR were still too strong to be abandoned out of hand Guevara called his party the "Authentic" MNR (MNRA), and ran in opposition to Paz Estenssoro. Predictably, he lost.

The MNRA opposition was allowed to continue its organization and to publish a newspaper after the election. But Guevara was beaten on the streets of La Paz two months ago, after which he prudently removed his residence from a main street to a secluded back road. Then, on February 21, 1961, the Government used a teachers' strike as an excuse for declaring a state of siege. With or without Paz's full knowledge, the Ministry of Government arrested and deported the main MNRA leaders. Guevara, who had been visiting Cochabamba during carnavales, escaped in his pajamas from the house of a friend and hid until he was able to take asylum with the Papal Nuncio in La Paz. He was allowed to go into exile in Santiago de Chile early in March.

Thus Paz Estenssoro, willingly or unwittingly, placed himself in the hands of the far left of the MNR. There is some reason to believe that he did not intend to do so. He has been a wise politician, recognizing the advantage of differing groups which he could play against one another and strengthen his own position. The MNRA is virtually destroyed, the moderates with Siles in Uruguay are neutralized. Lechín is strongly in the ascendancy and Paz has weakened his already shaky position. There is little doubt that the left can now exercise great influence on Paz precisely at the time when he needs freedom of action, and that the Government will move further to the left at a time when pending foreign aid and loans call for moderation. The once monolithic MNR is cracking and chipping. The ideal of a single party with agreed goals and a unified means of achieving them has always been far from reality; it may now be far from possibility.

Nine Years After the Revolution

The Bolivian National Revolution is about to celebrate its ninth anniversary, on April 9, 1961. Many of the men who fought on that autumn day have a frustrating sense of having come full circle, and the Government they might blame it on is the one they created. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, who nine years ago flew in from the Argentine border to take the reins of government from Provisional President Hernán Siles Zuazo is again wearing the presidential sash of office, again taken from Siles' willing hands. The Government, after years of absorbing the loss of the nationalized tin mines and sustaining strikes against itself by poverty stricken and angry miners, has made repeated attempts to contract the mines to a private corporation, and is even negotiating with the Patiño interests (former owners). Two years ago the Government took over the assets in Bolivia of an English railroad company rather than give it needed rate increases. For two years practically no spare parts have been

imported, maintenance has been insufficient, locomotives in running condition have declined from 63 to approximately 29. The railroad system of Bolivia is only months away from collapse, and the Government is negotiating with the original English company to resume management. A match factory was built by the Government, foreign matches and lighter fuel were prohibited, but Bolivians still prefer to smuggle in Peruvian matches. In 1952 there were few more bitter critics of the United States than Juan Lechín. In 1961 Vice President Lechín is in the United States sounding like America's firmest friend while he explains Bolivia's need for dollars. The ideals lie frayed and worn, not yet abandoned, but realities press hard.

Bolivians had high hopes for Víctor Paz Estenssoro in his new administration after four years of Siles' courageous but austere stand for stabilization. It seemed impossible that a man of Paz's stature, who had aged perceptibly in his first administration, and who seemed to welcome his four years in London, should suddenly decide to run again without a bold new plan to cure Bolivia's ills. He ran, he was solidly elected, and seven months ago he took office. Since then he has continued the stabilization policies of his predecessor, has settled strikes giving moderate increases, has presided over MNR self-analysis sessions, and agreed with the MNR youth group that the "new rich" should go before tribunals; but of the bold new plan there is no trace. Paz's administration has been characterized as one of drift, and the drift is toward the left.

As the drift continues problems become magnified, run together, and intensify one another. The Government became enough alarmed about the teachers' strike (they demanded a raise in the basic wage from $12.50 to $37.50 a month) that civil liberties were suspended and it was announced there would be no further negotiations with the teachers. The teachers were said to be fired, a few "emergency" teachers were hired. Then negotiations were resumed, the teachers accepted a raise to $16.55 a month beginning in October 1961, and the strike was declared at an end on March 10. The Minister of Education announced "there were neither victors nor vanquished" in the strike. More truly it seems that both sides lost. The Government, in spite of total mobilization, was unable to enforce a matter of principle. The teachers were unable to gain a living wage in a country where, since stabilization, food and clothing costs are comparable to those of the United States. The teachers can hardly be satisfied while they hover on the edge of starvation.

Meanwhile the miners keep striking and keep failing to win a subsistence wage. They depend on the mine commissaries, which at International Monetary Fund insistance, are forced to sell goods at unsubsidized prices. Each payday the miners line up for food, leaving practically nothing for other needs. The commissaries buy the cheapest goods they can obtain in bulk. Miners have ceased buying coffee because the adulterated product sold yields only a few cups per kilogram. At one mine the only sweet sold is a type of cough syrup. Poured on bread it is the only dessert for the children. Even simple tools are

unobtainable. Many miners work on piece rates and furnish their own tools. At the same mine the workers ordered 7,000 picks. They received 300. Acetylene lamps have disappeared, a drill must be shared among a team of men. Some men work at the dangerous task of removing old timbers from disused levels because there is no lumber to prop new tunnels. Small wonder the miners strike.

This year the International Monetary Fund mission in Bolivia had decided as its periodic matter of principle that gasoline prices should be raised. According to an independently contracted study of the YPFB (the government petroleum company) by De Golyer, MacNaughton, Inc. of Dallas, it cannot continue to operate and carry on new explorations with its present gasoline prices, which are less than four cents a liter for regular and less than ten cents a liter for premium. IMF insists that regular prices be raised to nearly seven cents a liter. This could easily spark a strike among the truck, bus, and taxi drivers, paralyzing the transportation on which the country depends while the railroads are slowing to a halt. In this respect, as with the stabilization plan as a whole, the Government is imperiled no matter what course it chooses. If the Government allows the increase it risks a general strike (as was narrowly averted during the teachers' strike) which would gladly be adhered to by disgruntled groups such as teachers and miners. The strike might be broken by force, although the Government is in no position to make itself more unpopular. A vast reservoir of ill feeling would be created with little accomplished. Moderate inflation would result which could be the straw breaking the back of long-suffering acceptance of a rising cost of living with frozen wages.

If the Government refuses to raise the price of gasoline, the IMF will not accept its letter of intent in another two months' time. It will not sign a new stand-by credit agreement, and Bolivia will not be able to redeem its dollar obligations to the IMF with new IMF money, as it has done in the past. Bolivia does not have other dollar resources and would presumably default, as it has temporarily done recently to international organizations by the expedient of giving million dollar checks which come back marked "no funds." But worse, from Bolivia's point of view, the United States still requires the IMF's approval of the fiscal position of a country before it will give substantial aid to that country. If the Bolivian Government cannot reach agreement with the IMF, the United States, as it has done in the past, will presumably simply stop further aid payments. At present, and among many other types of aid, these payments provide 20 per cent of the entire national budget. Without the aid program it is doubtful whether the Paz Government could remain in office.

There is a brighter side to the picture. Help appears to be coming from several directions for COMIBOL, the Bolivian Minerals Corporation which administers the nationalized tin mines. The United States Government, the Inter-American Development Bank, and a West German corporation (Salzgitter) have formulated a "Triangular Plan" for assisting Bolivia and par-

ticularly the mining industry. The United States has committed itself to a credit of $3,500,000, the Inter-American Development Bank to $10,000,000 plus a gift of $250,000 for technical assistance, and Salzgitter will take over management of the mines.

Salzgitter is to run the mines as a private enterprise, with power over hiring and firing, and to effect economies. The Government will have the responsibility for maintaining discipline in the mine unions. Some persons are dubious that the Government can control the unions when the German firm begins firing large numbers of miners, as it must. But the Government has a strong man in its Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Ñuflo Chavez Ortiz. He returned from obscurity when Víctor Paz appointed him to the office in his new administration. Chavez is a politically ambitious man, and he has had to lower his sights considerably from the time four years ago when he was aiming directly for the presidency. Now he appears to believe that he can build a new political basis only by dealing successfully with the COMIBOL problem. He is an able, though erratic man, and the problem seems nearer a solution than any time since 1952. The Inter-American Development Bank loan (bearing 4.5% interest, payable over 13 years, and with payments of principal not to begin for three years and in hard currency not for eight) is not all destined for COMIBOL. It is also to be disbursed for agricultural and industrial projects. If these are well handled, some displaced miners may be absorbed.

An unconfirmed credit to COMIBOL, of a type which could happen only in Bolivia, has been announced by Antenor Patiño, former major owner of mines nationalized in 1952. He gave word to the Minister of Mines that he would personally guarantee a $5,000,000 loan to COMIBOL. There is reason for his apparently misplaced generosity. Last year the Bolivian Congress passed the "Patiño Law" which altered the Bolivian divorce laws in such a way that Antenor Patiño could be legally divorced according to the laws of his native country (but where he has never lived). This allowed Patiño to make a favorable property settlement with his long-estranged Bourbon wife. In return Patiño is said to have promised the Government $5,000,000. The law was vigorously opposed by many MNR members of Congress, and was vetoed by President Paz, but the story is that he threatened reprisals against any congressman who did not vote to override the veto. In any event the famous Patiño marital difficulties may help COMIBOL in its troubled marriage with the state.

A major question mark is the national direction the campesino movement will take. As described in previous Reports the campesino movement, or movements, grew up largely by themselves. Some had their origin in campesino veterans groups after the Chaco War, some were formed for the purpose of renting land to escape personal service obligations. After the revolution lack of organized authority in the rural areas encouraged the growth of "agrarian syndicates" or unions formed by the campesinos themselves and modeled after a particular syndicate, that of Ucureña in the Cliza Valley near Cochabamba. The particularly vigorous organizer and leader of this syndicate, José Rojas,

at one time appeared well on the way to becoming the man who would be the link between the organized campesinos and the national leaders of the MNR. As time passes however, he looks more and more like another of the false starts of the campesinos. Since his strategic defeat in open warfare (with machine guns and trenches) in the Cliza Valley in November 1960, he has sulked in the isolated mestizo town of Punata while his once impressive power is passing to other hands.

His principal campesino rival is Miguel Veizaga who narrowly escaped death reportedly in the pitched battles in November. Some newspapers in La Paz have accused both the Rojas forces in Ucureña and also the Ministry of Government of provoking the fighting for the purpose of eliminating Veizaga and dispersing his followers. But Veizaga continues to live openly in his small house on the outskirts of the town of Cliza, and to consolidate his influence over the dense surrounding mass of campesinos. But this can be a long process, and meanwhile the position of the rural people is confused and disorganized. Not only is this true among the Quechua speakers of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca, but the once promising liaisons between them and the Aymará speakers of the Altiplano have become weakened.

The wielding of the great power resident in Bolivia's two and a half million campesinos has turned out to be no simple problem. At present the Government can command this power only in block voting in national elections, which are events of no great moment to most campesinos, and through the still great influence and popularity of President Víctor Paz. But MNR has never been able to command the movement, nor fully absorb it into a loyal organ of the party. The attempt has been made, however, in various ways.

One approach has been direct, prolonged, and friendly contact with campesino leaders by national figures. The most successful of these attempts was made by Ñuflo Chavez Ortiz when he was Minister of Campesino Affairs, from 1952 to 1956. Chavez is a shrewd man with a vast knowledge of the rural affairs of all of Bolivia, although he is a native of the Department of Santa Cruz which has very different problems from those of the western highlands. He spent a great deal of time in Ucureña, cultivated Rojas, and instructed him in the political arts. His success in bringing the campesinos into the MNR orbit was a large part of the reason for his designation as vice presidential candidate in 1956. But his abortive attempt on the presidency in the Siles administration removed him and the principal connection with the campesinos from the political scene.

Another approach was the elevation of campesinos themselves to national office. This has proved disastrous. An early and unusual figure of this type was Germán Vera Tapia, the able and intelligent son of a comparatively wealthy campesino family of an estancia near the city of Cochabamba. Family resources enabled him to attend law school and he became one of the early organizers of the MNR. After the revolution he was made Minister of Agricul-

ture. If he had cultivated rather than disparaged his campesino ties he might today be their recognized leader and mobilizer within the Government. However, he sought status among the Spanish speakers of the cities, minimized his campesino origins, moved far to the right, and finally joined Guevara Arze in the separatist MNRA party. Already in eclipse, he was among those deported at the beginning of the present state of siege.

Almost ludicrous was the attempt to elevate José Rojas to the Ministry of Campesino Affairs for a brief period in the Siles administration. Although he speaks a halting Spanish he conducted interviews with foreign visitors in Quechua. The puzzled French, Germans, and Americans were forced to use an interpreter, or two if they were unfortunate enough not to speak Spanish. His main occupation was securing positions for fellow Cochabambans, but his chauffeured existence in La Paz weakened his authority over the campesinos who remained behind. By the time he was removed from office he had permanently moved his residence from the rancheria of Ucureña, the seat of his power, to the town of Punata.

Most dramatic of the failures to build a campesino following from the top was the murder of Vicente Alvarez Plata, brother of former Acting Vice President Frederico Alvarez Plata. Vicente Alvarez Plata was another Minister of Campesino Affairs under Siles. He chose the Altiplano Aymará speakers as his field of action and made frequent trips to the villages to organize them into a personal following. When he was less than successful he attempted to substitute imposition for persuasion. In one of the villages his rashness was met by the simple expedient of killing him. The village has since considerately named a school in his memory.

The newest entry in the field is Juan Lechín. In still another facet of his political change in character he is hedging his bets on the miners with overtures to the campesinos. Lechín built his political machine among the miners and as head of their union. He has never had any particular following among the campesinos. Recently his men have been active on the Altiplano, and he himself took advantage of the Cliza disturbances of November to make a well-publicized expedition there for conversations with Miguel Veizaga. Not publicized was the fact that he remained within the well-guarded environs of Cliza and stayed well out of range of the armed camp of Ucureña. It seems doubtful that Lechín will be able to create the following among campesinos he once had among the miners. The campesinos, it appears, are not up for grabs, but are slowly evolving their own new leadership. Miguel Veizaga will be prominent in this leadership.

Veizaga is a different person from José Rojas. He is articulate, enjoys playing chess, and for a time was an "evangelist," a convert to a fundamentalist Protestant sect active in the valley. He resides in an indeterminate area on the fringe of Cliza which is not identified as either "town" or "rural." This is a part of his philosophy of working with campesinos closely surrounding the

towns and the city of Cochabamba, those who have been least happy with Rojas' forceful and sometimes brutal methods. He has the support of many of the townspeople of Cochabamba.

The campesinos continue the process of acculturation, of socially becoming more similar to the Spanish-speaking mestizos. But temporarily, through the failure of their own organization and the inability of the Government to fully incorporate them into the government party, the social changes are not yet paralleled by corresponding political changes.

Conclusion

Many constructions have been placed on the untidy Bolivian situation, the most pessimistic by those who began with the brightest hopes. But those who have experienced other revolutions, or those who have studied the actual progress of other revolutions and compared their final course with their initial goals find consolation in the comparison.

It is certain that Bolivia has reached the end of the second stage of its revolution. Reiteration of goals no longer suffices. A real improvement in productive capacity must take place and a share of the proceeds must be distributed to raise the general standard of living. Only in this way will the majority have a sense of sharing in a successful experiment, and feel a personal stake in preserving a political machine which allows them to earn their bread at the same time it brings them new liberties and dignity.

Apparently Bolivia will not enter the third stage without help. This is not entirely nor predominantly the fault of the MNR. When the type of internal discipline as existed prior to 1952 is destroyed as completely as it was in 1952, a new kind of order is not constructed quickly. The best, although partial, answer is United States assistance. The United States has realized this, and has given more aid, more consistently, to Bolivia than to any other Latin American country.

At this moment a team of U.S. State Department and ICA officials are at work on a complete reappraisal of aid to Bolivia at the request of President Kennedy. They are able men, and their study could not come at a more opportune time. Bolivia presents a challenge to the United States to design a new type of foreign aid, one which does not presuppose the reserves of technical ability of the countries assisted in Europe, but one which combines a certain amount of capital with technical assistance in the true sense of the word, assistance which would help provide the technical, mechanical basis for the efficient utilization of the capital in a self-consciously underdeveloped nation. The United States has not solved the problem after nearly nine years and $175 million. With other Latin American countries curiously watching the Bolivian experiment, and with the Soviet Union offering $150 million and a

tin smelter to Bolivia, it is time to face the problem as squarely as possible, with the best minds available brought to bear on it.

* * * * *

Meanwhile life goes on in La Paz. A housewife can still buy a piece of bread for Bs.200. The children have returned to school. Carnavales was celebrated with water-throwing enthusiasm. A few families buy new cars. Parks swarm with picnickers on Sunday afternoons.

Over the years of troubled history Paceños have come to live with a sense of crisis. For the moment they have made their peace with an existence of uncertainty. But the tension below the surface can break out at any time and no man can tell the direction it would take. The lion lies down with the lamb, but he does not sleep.

Richard W. Patch

APPENDIX

Bolivian Personalities: Political Data in Brief

1. Frederico Alvarez Plata (Centellas)

1952:	Minister of Economy
1953:	Member of Agrarian Reform Commission
1953 - 56:	Minister of Education
1957 - 60:	Senator for Department of La Paz President of the Senate Acting Vice President of the Republic
1960 - :	Senator for La Paz, only.

2. Vicente Alvarez Plata (Centellas)

1957 - 58:	Minister of Campesino Affairs
1958 - 59:	Head of Departmental Federation of Campesinos of La Paz
1959:	Assassinated by campesinos.

3. Ñuflo Chavez (Ortiz)

1952 - 56:	Minister of Campesino Affairs
1956 - 57:	Vice President of the Republic
1957:	Resignation accepted after power struggle with President Siles.
1957 - 60:	Practicing lawyer in La Paz, in political obscurity.
1960 - :	Minister of Mines and Petroleum

4. Wálter Guevara (Arze)

1952 - 56:	Minister of Foreign Affairs
1956:	Political views found unacceptable in MNR convention, resignation accepted.
1956 - 58:	Ambassador to France
1958 - 59:	Minister of Government
1960:	January-March, Minister of Foreign Affairs March, Disappointed in ambition to be MNR presidential candidate. April, Formed separate party, Authentic MNR (MNRA). June, Defeated as presidential candidate of MNRA.
1960 - 61:	In opposition to MNR. Resided in La Paz.
1961:	March, Deported to Santiago de Chile.

5. Juan Lechín (Oquendo)

1952 - 54:	Minister of Mines and Petroleum
1954:	Resignation accepted.
1954 - 60:	Executive Secretary of Bolivian Workers Central (COB)
1956 - 60:	Senator for Potosí
1960 - :	Vice President of the Republic

6. Antenor Patiño

Son of Simón Patiño, founder of Bolivia's tin industry. Largest owner of mines nationalized in 1952.

7. Víctor Paz (Estenssoro)

1952 - 56:	President of the Republic
1956 - 60:	Ambassador to the Court of St. James
1960 - :	President of the Republic

8. José Rojas (Guevara)

1952 - 58:	"Maximum Chief" of campesinos of Cochabamba
1958 - 59:	Minister of Campesino Affairs
1959 - :	Campesino leader, in apparent political decline.

9. Hernán Siles (Zuazo)

1952:	April, Provisional President of the Republic
1952 - 56:	Vice President of the Republic
1956 - 60:	President of the Republic
1960 - :	Ambassador to Uruguay

10. Miguel Veizaga

1952 - 58:	Virtually unknown campesino.
1958 - :	Challenger of José Rojas for campesino leadership.

11. Germán Vera (Tapia)

1952 - 53:	Minister of Agriculture
1954 - 56:	Head of MNR in Cochabamba
1956 - 59:	Practicing lawyer in La Paz, in political obscurity.
1960:	Joined separatist MNRA.
1961:	Deported.